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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Robert Leroy Huck appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. After his motion to 
suppress was denied, Mr. Huck pleaded guilty and preserved the right to appeal from 
the denial of his motion. The district court imposed unified sentences of seven years, 
with three years fixed, and 180 days, and it retained jurisdiction. Mr. Huck appeals, and 
he asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The following facts are taken from the district court's findings of fact on 
Mr. Huck's motion to suppress. On June 16, 2011, Officers Kelly Montoya, Jim 
Schiffler, Guy Borgeau and Officer Phillips, all from the Boise Police Department, were 
working together as a "Direct Patrol Team." (R., p.126.) Shortly before 7:30 p.m., 
Officer Phillips received information regarding a drug transaction occurring in the 
Albertson's parking lot at the corner of Overland and Vista in Boise. (R., p.126.) Officer 
Phillips dispatched the other officers who were each in separate patrol vehicles to 
respond to the scene. (R., p.126.) He informed the other officers that Mr. Huck may be 
in possession of narcotics and provided a description of Mr. Huck and the vehicle he 
was driving. (R., p.126.) Other than the information received from Officer Phillips, the 
three other officers had no independent information regarding the situation. (R., p.126.) 
In responding to the scene, Officer Montoya observed Mr. Huck driving westbound on 
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Overland and proceeded to follow the vehicle from a distance of about two car lengths. 
(R., p.126.) The other officers followed behind at various distances. (R., p.126.) 
At approximately 7:30 p.m., Officer Montoya witnessed Mr. Huck's vehicle make 
a northbound turn onto Roosevelt Street. (R., p.126.) He proceeded to initiate a traffic 
stop based on his observation that Mr. Huck failed to utilize his turn signal for the period 
of time or distance as required by Idaho Code § 49-808(2) prior to making the turn. 
(R., pp.126-27.) Officers Schiffler and Borgeau arrived and stopped at the scene of the 
traffic stop within a few seconds of the stop. (R., p.127.) Officer Montoya contacted 
Mr. Huck in his vehicle, informed him of the reason for the traffic stop, and obtained his 
driver's license. (R., p.127.) He told Mr. Huck that when making the turn onto 
Roosevelt Street he did not engage the turn signal until he was already into the turn. 
(R., p.127.) 
After returning to his vehicle and running Mr. Huck's information through 
dispatch, Officer Montoya asked Mr. Huck if he had any problem if he searched the 
vehicle. (R., p.127.) Mr. Huck refused the request, stating that it was not his vehicle. 
(R., p.127.) Officer Montoya then asked Officer Schiffler to write the traffic citation while 
he went to retrieve his K-9 drug dog, Remco. (R., p.127.) 
After returning with the drug dog, Officer Montoya advised Mr. Huck that he was 
going to use the dog to conduct a sniff around the exterior of the vehicle and directed 
Mr. Huck to exit the vehicle and stand over next to Officer Borgeau. (R., p.127.) Officer 
Borgeau also directed Mr. Huck to exit the vehicle and directed him not to put his hands 
in his pockets. (R., p.127.) Officer Borgeau testified that Mr. Huck appeared nervous 
and was hesitant to exit the vehicle and, prior to exiting, rolled up the window and 
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locked the door. (R., p.127.) Officer Borgeau ordered Mr. Huck to place the keys on 
the top of the car explaining that it was a "safety issue." (R., p.127.) Mr. Huck complied 
but questioned the request, arguing that it was not his car. Officer Borgeau testified that 
after Mr. Huck exited the vehicle, he turned away from him and toward the car, dropping 
his hands down towards the front of his waistband area and out of sight. (R., p.127.) 
This sudden movement immediately led Officer Borgeau to suspect Mr. Huck was either 
attempting to conceal evidence or retrieve a weapon. (R., p.127.) In response, Officer 
Borgeau grabbed Mr. Huck by the forearm and led the Defendant to the rear of the 
vehicle for the purpose of conducting a pat-down search of Mr. Huck. Prior to 
conducting the pat-down, Officer Borgeau asked Mr. Huck if he had anything on his 
person he needed to know about, including "weapons, needles or anything that would 
hurt him." (R., p.127.) Mr. Huck responded he had no weapons or needles. When 
asked if he had "something else" on his person, Mr. Huck admitted to having 
methamphetamine in his pocket. (R., p.127.) 
Meanwhile, the dog's sniff of the vehicle's exterior resulted in an alert near the 
driver-side door. (R., p.128.) Officer Montoya then proceeded to deploy his drug dog to 
conduct a sniff of the interior of the vehicle, resulting in the dog alerting to a black bag 
sitting on the passenger seat. (R., p.128.) A subsequent search of the black bag by 
Officer Montoya revealed seven syringes and a digital scale. (R., p.128.) Mr. Huck was 
subsequently placed under arrest. At no time prior to the arrest was Mr. Huck read his 
Miranda 1 rights. (R., p.128.) The traffic stop until the time of the arrest lasted 
approximately ten (10) minutes. 
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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Mr. Huck was charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession 
of drug paraphernalia. (R., p.30.) The State subsequently sought a persistent violator 
enhancement, which was granted. (R., pp.50, 58.) Mr. Huck then filed a motion to 
suppress, asserting that: (1) the State lacked probable cause to conduct a traffic stop; 
(2) there was no reasonable, articulable suspicion to remove Mr. Huck from his vehicle; 
(3) Mr. Huck's detention was prolonged; (4) law enforcement failed to advise Mr. Huck 
adequately of his M;randa rights; and (5) there was no evidence of the K-9's 
qualifications. (R., pp.51-52.) 
The district court denied the motion to suppress. (R., p.126.) Mr. Huck 
subsequently pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance and possession of 
drug paraphernalia and preserved the right to appeal from the denial of his motion to 
suppress. (R., p.141.) The district court imposed unified sentences of seven years, 
with three years fixed, and 180 days, and it retained jurisdiction. (R., p.156.) Mr. Huck 




Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Huck's motion to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Huck's Motion To Suppress 
A Introduction 
Mr. Huck asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress 
because both the stop and the search of his vehicle were illegal. 
8. Standard Of Review 
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated." State v. Holland, 
135 Idaho 159 (2000). When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the 
appellate court should "accept the trial court's findings of fact which were supported by 
substantial evidence, but freely review the application of constitutional principles to the 
facts as found." Id. "Decisions regarding the credibility of witnesses, weight to be given 
to conflicting evidence, and factual inferences to be drawn are also within the discretion 
of the trial court." State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810 (2009). 
C. The District Court Erred VVhen It Denied Mr. Huck's Motion To Suppress 
Mr. Huck's motion to suppress asserted five grounds for suppression, which the 
district court addressed in turn. Mr. Huck will address the grounds in the same order on 
appeal. 2 
2 One of the bases upon which Mr. Huck challenged the search of his vehicle was the 
allegation that the drug dog was not qualified. This argument was based on the fact 
that no evidence of the dog's training or experience had been disclosed. Because the 
dog's qualifications were addressed at the hearing, Mr. Huck does not raise this claim 
on appeal. 
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1. Illegal Stop 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable 
searches and seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Idaho Constitution contains a 
virtually identical provision to protect its citizens from unreasonable searches and 
seizures. ID. CONST. art. I,§ 17; State v. Alexander, 138 Idaho 18, 22 (Ct. App. 2002). 
Searches and seizures without a valid warrant are presumed unreasonable and violate 
both constitutional provisions. State v. Nunez, 138 Idaho 636, 640 (2003). If evidence 
is not seized pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, the 
evidence discovered as a result of the illegal search must be excluded as the "fruit of 
the poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The purpose of 
these constitutional rights is to "impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise 
of discretion by governmental agents and thereby safeguard an individual's privacy and 
security against arbitrary invasions." State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 824 (Ct. App. 
2002) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979)). 
A vehicle stop constitutes a seizure of its occupants and is therefore subject to 
constitutional limits. State v. Cerino, 141 Idaho 736, 737 (Ct. App. 2005); State v. 
Roark, 140 Idaho 868, 870 (Ct. App. 2004). An officer may conduct an investigatory 
stop without violating a individual's constitutional rights if under the totality of the 
circumstances the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that the person has 
committed or is about to commit a crime. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 379 
(Ct. App. 2003). When challenged, the State bears the burden to prove a valid 
investigatory stop. State v. Salato, 137 Idaho 260, 264 (Ct. App. 2001 ). The State must 
demonstrate that at the time of the stop the officer possessed reasonable, articulable 
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suspicion that the person is engaged in or about to be engaged in criminal activity. 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968). "The officer's suspicion must be more than a mere 
hunch. . ." State v. Schumacher, 136 Idaho 509, 515 (2001 ). '"Based upon that whole 
picture the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for 
suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity."' Wilson v. Idaho 
Transportation Department 136 Idaho 270, 274 (Ct. App. 2001) (quoting United 
States v. Cortez, 499 U.S. 411, 417-418 (1981)). 
In this case, the State asserted that Officer Montoya initiated the traffic stop 
because Mr. Huck had failed to engage his turn signal prior to turning onto Roosevelt 
Street. Idaho Code § 49-808(2) provides: 
A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required shall be 
given continuously to warn other traffic. On controlled-access highways 
and before turning from a parked position, the signal shall be given 
continuously for not less than five (5) seconds and, in all other instances, 
for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle 
before turning. 
I.C. § 49-808(2). The district court found that there was no evidence that Overland 
Road constituted a "controlled-access highway," and thus the applicable law required 
that Mr. Huck engage his turn signal not less than one hundred feet before turning. 
(R., p.129.) Mr. Huck does not dispute this finding. 
The district court noted that there was conflicting evidence on when Mr. Huck 
activated his turn signal. The court found that in the audio of the stop, Officer Montoya 
informed Mr. Huck that he engaged the signal "immediately when you were already into 
your turn," and that during the suppression hearing, Officer Montoya testified that 
Mr. Huck did not engage his signal until he was already into his turn. (R., p.129.) In the 
audio, Mr. Huck stated that he engaged the signal two to three seconds prior to the turn 
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if he was lucky, and at the suppression hearing, Mr. Huck testified that he engaged the 
signal two or three seconds prior to turning. (R., p.130.)3 
The district court found Officer Montoya to be more credible because his 
testimony was corroborated by the audio of the stop and because Mr. Huck's 
recollection lacked the same degree of certainty. (R., p.130.) Mindful of the fact that 
credibility determinations are left to the discretion of the trial court, Mr. Huck asserts that 
his testimony was credible and consistent with the audio as well. Mr. Huck consistently 
maintained that he signaled about 2-3 seconds prior to turning, and he asserts that the 
district court should have accepted his testimony. 
If Mr. Huck's testimony is accepted, this Court should hold that the stop was 
illegal. The district court held that, even if Mr. Huck was correct and he activated his 
turn signal when he insisted he did, Mr. Huck would have been about 102.6 feet away 
from the turn when he activated his signal. (R., p.130.) The district court concluded 
that such evidence would give Officer Montoya reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle 
to investigate further. The court stated: 
Put differently, a finding that the Defendant engaged his turn signal 102.6 
prior to making the turn would suffice for purposes of defeating a traffic 
citation for failing to properly signal but the close proximity to the 100 foot 
requirement puts the stop well within the margin of reasonableness for 
purposes of initiating the stop for a suspected violation. 
(R., p.130.) Reasonable suspicion requires more than a hunch or "inchoate or 
unparticularized suspicion." State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811 (2009) (citing 
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990)). Officer Montoya's estimate amounted 
3 While there is an audio recording of the stop (Exhibit 1 ), there is no video recording. 
Thus, the only evidence concerning when Mr. Huck activated his signal comes from the 
testimony of Officer Montoya and Mr. Huck. 
9 
only to a hunch that any law had been violated. City of Chippewa Falls v. 
Hein, 788 N.W.2d 384 (Ct. App. Wisc. 2010) ("Finally, we agree Kelm's speed estimate 
is insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion because the record is devoid of any 
testimony or evidence to substantiate the reliability of that observation.") When 
Mr. Huck signaled, Officer Montoya had only a hunch that the signal might have been 
late. Officer Montoya, therefore, did not possess reasonable, articulable suspicion that 
Mr. Huck failed to engage his signal properly. 
2. Removal From The Vehicle 
Both the United States Supreme Court and Idaho courts have held that a police 
order to exit a vehicle is a de minimis intrusion into a driver's personal liberty. See 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977); State v. Metzger, 144 Idaho 397, 401 
(Ct. App. 2007); State v. !twin, 143 Idaho 02, 105 (Ct. App. 2006). "Based on Mimms 
and Wilson, we have expressed the general rule that as a matter of course in a valid 
traffic stop, a police officer may order the occupants of a vehicle to exit or remain 
inside." !twin, 143 Idaho at 105 (emphasis added). "Thus given our ... analysis in !twin, 
within [law enforcement's] power to order occupants out of a vehicle during a legitimate 
traffic stop, an officer may open the vehicle door himself." Metzger, 144 Idaho at 144 
(emphasis added). 
In denying the motion to suppress, the district court held that, because the stop 
was valid, it was permissible for Officer Bourgeau to order Mr. Huck to exit the vehicle. 
(R., p.131.) As set forth above, the stop in this case was illegal. Therefore, Officer 
Bourgeau's order to Mr. Huck to exit his vehicle following the illegal stop violated 
Mr. Huck's 4th Amendment rights. 
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3. Miranda Violation 
Pursuant to Miranda, "an individual held for interrogation must be clearly 
informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him 
during interrogation." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966). Miranda warnings 
are required where a suspect is "in custody," a fact determined by "whether there is a 
'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a 
formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (percuriam) (quoting 
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam)). To determine whether 
custody has attached, "a court must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the 
interrogation." Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994). The test is an 
objective one and "the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's 
position would have understood his situation." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 
(1984). 
When considering whether an individual is in custody, this Court, "must consider 
all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation." State v. Doe, 137 Idaho 519, 
523 (2002) (quoting State v. Doe, 130 Idaho 811,816 (Ct. App. 1997)). The Court in 
Berkemer considered a variety of factors: the short duration of the stop, the modest 
number of questions, and the visibility of the stop. Berkemer, 468 U.S at 441-42. In 
addition, the Court noted that "[a]t no point during that interval was respondent informed 
that his detention would not be temporary." Id. The burden of showing custody rests on 
the defendant seeking to exclude evidence based on a failure to administer Miranda 
warnings. State v. James, 148 Idaho 574, 577 (2010). 
The district court's findings of fact related to this issue are as follows: 
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Officer Borgeau testified that from the time of the stop to the arrest took 
less than 10 minutes. This is consistent with the audio of the stop from the 
time officer Montoya made contact with the Defendant up until the 
Defendant was placed under arrest. Officer Borgeau testified at the 
suppression hearing that an average traffic stop lasts approximately 10 
minutes. Officer Montoya testified that the average time for a stop takes 
about 10-15 minutes. Therefore, the duration of the detention prior to the 
arrest, being consistent with the average amount of time necessary for 
such a stop, did not exceed beyond that necessary to effectuate the 
purpose of the stop. As discussed elsewhere in this opinion, this is true 
even with the use of the Drug Dog. As to visibility the stop was made at 
approximately 7:30 p.m. on Roosevelt Street near the intersection of 
Overland Road and Roosevelt. Both Overland Road and Roosevelt Street 
are relatively busy streets. There is no evidence in the record to suggest 
that the Defendant was stopped in an area of Roosevelt Street that was 
not visible to motorists passing by on either Roosevelt or Overland. 
(R., pp.132-33.) The court then cited to a list of questions Mr. Huck was asked prior to 
admitting that he had methamphetamine in his pocket. (R., p.133.) The court found the 
number of questions asked to be modest and consistent with a standard frisk 
procedure. (R., p.133.) 
As Mr. Huck argued to the district court, Officer Bourgeau asked Mr. Huck if he 
"had anything dangerous on his person so that he could safely conduct a Terry search 
despite the fact that Mr. Huck denied having any weapons. Officer Bourgeau continued 
to ask Mr. Huck what else he had on his person. At this point, there [were] at least three 
officers on scene, Mr. Huck [was] not free to leave, and he [was] being interrogated." 
(R., pp.83-84.) Mr. Huck therefore asserts that he was in custody because he had been 
ordered out of the vehicle, frisked despite denying he had weapons, and there were 
three officers on the scene. Mr. Huck therefore asserts that the district court erred by 
denying his motion to suppress on this basis. 
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The Stop Was Unreasonably Extended 
Mr. Huck challenged the search of his vehicle on the basis that the stop was 
unreasonably prolonged by the time the drug dog alerted on the vehicle. The district 
court held: 1) Mr. Huck lacked standing to challenge the search of the vehicle; and 2) 
the stop was not unreasonably prolonged. (R., pp.135, 136.) Mr. Huck will first address 
the standing issue. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that the test for determining whether 
a defendant has the "capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends 
. . . upon whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 
143 (1978). Therefore, the question in this case is whether Mr. Huck had a privacy 
interest in the vehicle he was driving. 
In F?akas, the United States Supreme Court made it clear that standing does not 
turn on ownership. Rakas held, "[The] capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment depends not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether 
the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the invaded place." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143. In this case, there is no dispute 
that Mr. Huck had permission from the owner of the vehicle to drive it. 
Federal circuit courts of appeal have routinely held that non-owners of 
automobiles who are legitimately driving those cars have standing to contest 
governmental searches of those vehicles. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 
546, 548 (11th Cir. 1987) (driver of car borrowed from friend has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the car); United States v. Valdez Hocker, 333 F.3d 1206, 1209-
13 
1211 (10th Cir. 2003) (driver of car borrowed from relative of owner believed to have 
authority to loan car out has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car); United 
States v. Portillo, 633 F.1313, 1316-1317 (9th Cir. 1980) (driver of car borrowed from 
friend has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car, but passenger does not); 
United States v. Williams, 714 F.2d 777, 779 n.1 (8th Cir. 1983) (driver of car borrowed 
from nephew's roommate, where driver has borrowed same car on prior occasions, has 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car); United States v. Walker, 237 F.3d 845, 
848-849 (7th Cir. 2001) (authorized driver of rental car has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the car); United States v. Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413, 14'17-14'19 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(driver of borrowed car has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car); United 
States v. Griffin, 729 F.2d 475, 483 n.11 (7th Cir. 1984) (unlicensed driver, as well as 
his passenger, of car borrowed from a close relative, both have reasonable 
expectations of privacy in the car); United States v. Baker, 221 F.3d 438, 442-443 (3rd 
Cir. 2000) (driver of car borrowed from friend and driven for multiple weeks has 
reasonable expectation of privacy in car); United States v. Ponce, 947 F.2d 646, 649 
(2nd Cir. 1991) ("To mount a challenge to a search of a vehicle, defendants must show, 
among other things, a legitimate basis for being in it, such as permission from the 
owner."); United States v. Pena, 961 F.2d 333, 337 (2nd Cir. 1992) ("It is not the law, 
however, that only the owner of a vehicle may have a Fourth Amendment privacy 
interest therein that is protected against governmental invasion. Rather, the borrower of 
an automobile can possess such an interest."). Mr. Huck asserts the fact that he was 
given permission to drive the vehicle from the owner, by itself, is sufficient to confer 
standing to challenge the search. 
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In the context of rental cars, the Court of Appeals has adopted a totality of the 
circumstances test to determine whether a non-renter has standing to challenge a 
search. See State v. Cutler, 144 Idaho 272 (Ct. App. 2007). In Cutter the court adopted 
a standard from the Sixth Circuit, which focuses on factors such as: (1) whether the 
defendant had a driver's license; (2) the relationship between the unauthorized driver 
and the lessee; (3) the driver's ability to present rental documents; (4) whether the driver 
had the lessee's permission to use the car; and (5) the driver's relationship with the 
rental company. Id. at 275. Judge Lansing wrote separately, 
to express my view that in the vast majority of cases, the question 
whether the driver of a rental car had direct permission to use the car 
from the lessee or from a contractually authorized driver will be 
dispositive of the standing question. The existence of such 
permission should ordinarily be sufficient to confer a privacy interest 
upon the driver if and to the same extent that the lessee possesses 
such a privacy interest. Only in extraordinary circumstances would I hold 
that a driver who did not obtain permission from the lessee or other 
authorized driver could have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
vehicle. 
Id. at 276. Surely, if a lessee can confer a privacy interest by giving a third party 
permission to use the automobile, the owner of the automobile can as well. 
The district court made the following factual findings concerning this issue: 
In this case, the Defendant testified that the vehicle he was driving 
belonged to relatives of his wife. The Defendant testified that he was given 
limited permission to drive the vehicle from the Albertson's parking lot to 
home, which would take about twenty minutes and that he did not have 
permission to drive the car wherever he wanted. He further testified that 
he did not have authorization to consent to a search of the vehicle, which 
is consistent with the statements made by the Defendant on the audio of 
the stop. 
(R., pp.135-36.) As set forth above, Mr. Huck asserts that the fact that he was a 
permissive driver, by itself, should confer standing. However, if a totality of the 
circumstances test is used, he asserts that he still had standing to challenge the search. 
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The district court focused on the limited permission to only drive the vehicle 
home and the fact that Mr. Huck informed the officers that he was told not to consent to 
any search. The fact that Mr. Huck was told not to permit any searches of the car, far 
from indicating that he had no expectation of privacy, establishes that he did have an 
expectation of privacy because the one power he was given from the owner was to 
exclude others, including the police, from entering the vehicle. This is the hallmark of a 
privacy interest and it demonstrates that Mr. Huck had a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the vehicle. Thus, the district court erred by concluding that Mr. Huck lacked 
standing. 
Regarding the prolonged detention, the United States Supreme Court has stated 
that an investigative detention "must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary 
to effectuate the purpose of the stop." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). See 
also State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 491 (1992). An individual "may not be detained even 
momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so." Royer, 460 U.S. at 
498. 
These same standards apply where the detention at issue is a traffic stop. See, 
e.g., State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 562 (Ct.App. 2005). "The question whether an 
investigative detention is reasonable requires a dual inquiry into (1) whether the officer's 
action was justified at its inception, and (2) whether it is reasonably related in scope to 
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Id. While the 
purpose of a stop is not inevitably fixed at the point of the initiation of the traffic stop, 
and may evolve based upon additional information coming to light, any extension of the 
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detention must be carefully tailored to the underlying justification of the stop. Id. at 562-
563. 
The district court made the following factual findings regarding the prolonged 
detention: 
In this case, Officer Montoya had the Drug Dog with him when he initiated 
the traffic stop. As a result, there was no delay in the duration of the stop 
to wait for a dog to arrive. Furthermore, the sniff was conducted while a 
citation was being prepared by one of the other officers. See e.g. 
Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 362-63, 17 P.3d at 307-308 (holding that it is 
permissible for one officer to conduct a drug dog sniff while another officer 
"was busy checking on [the driver's] status and writing out a citation"). 
Therefore, the stop did not last longer than was necessary to effectuate 
the purpose of the stop. 
(R., p.136.) While it is true that Officer Montoya had the drug dog with him and another 
officer had been delegated the responsibility for the citation, as Mr. Huck argued, that 
officer never spoke with Mr. Huck and never issued a citation to Mr. Huck. (R., p.86.) 
Further, the audio of the stop reveals that, after checking Mr. Huck's license and 
suspension and discovering that Mr. Huck had a criminal history, Officer Montoya 
questioned Mr. Huck regarding that history, even though this was not related to the 
purpose of the stop. (State's Exhibit 1.) 
Mr. Huck acknowledges that the Court of Appeals has held, "brief inquiries not 
otherwise related to the initial purpose of the stop do not necessarily violate a detainee's 
Fourth Amendment rights. State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 362 (Ct. App. 2000) 
Other cases have also sanctioned brief questioning on matters unrelated to the traffic 
stop where the questioning was supported by the officer's specific, personalized 
knowledge of the defendant or of circumstances amounting to reasonable suspicion. 
See State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 984-985 (Ct. App. 2003) (identifying ten separate 
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factors within the officer's knowledge that provided reasonable, articulable suspicion of 
criminal activity). Here, however, the officer possessed no such information, only that 
another officer believed Mr. Huck may have possessed narcotics. In this case, 
Mr. Huck asserts that there was no cause to question him regarding his criminal history, 
and that the stop has been unreasonably prolonged by the time the drug dog alerted to 
the vehicle. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Huck respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction 
and reverse the order denying his motion to suppress. 
DATED this 8th day of January, 2012. 
l 
JUSTI~ M. '~URTIS 
Deput/~tate)Appellate Public Defender ·---
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